

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

18 June 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

John J. Bird

National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT:


Monthly Warning Reports for May 1987

1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:

Afghanistan/Pakistan/USSR

The Intelligence Community believes there is some possibility—though less than even—of Soviet and/or Afghan ground forces operations into Pakistan this summer, perhaps in response to a series of successful Stinger shootdowns, more resistance raids inside the Soviet Union or to influence the Geneva talks. DIA and CIA/NESA believe there is some chance that Soviet troops might be used. INR and CIA/SOVA, however, believe that Moscow would seek to minimize international fallout by relying on the Afghans.

This review relects consideration of inputs generated at warning meetings conducted by the National Intelligence Officers with community representatives from all areas. As such, it represents a community-wide review, but it is not a formally coordinated community product.



Iran/Iraq/Persian Gulf

The Intelligence Community believes that the presence of a US flag on an unescorted ship in the Persian Gulf will not deter attack. There is a spectrum of opinion on the likelihood of an attack on a US escort ship. Most in the Community believe that Iran will seek ways to demonstrate it is not intimidated by the presence of US warships—for example creating a tactical situation in which Tehran successfully could attack or mine a Kuwaiti reflagged vessel. The Community does not believe the Iranians will use Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles against US naval vessels without a further racheting up of tensions. Some in the Community are concerned that Iran is likely to confront the US soon in an effort to get the US out of the Gulf by raising the specter of a costly and open-ended US commitment in the Gulf.

Chad/Libya

A Chadian attack on Libyan positions in the Aozou area appears likely soon, despite French and other external efforts to dissuade Habre. Chadian forces stand a reasonably good chance of success. NIO/Warning notes that as the Libyan public's appreciation of the extent of Qadhafi's failures in Chadincreases, popular backlash will diminish Qadhafi's chances of retaining power.

2. Trend Commentary:

Kurds/Iran/Iraq/Turkey

Iranian support for Iraq's Kurdish insurgency is posing a threat to Turkey as well. Although there is not an imminent danger to Turkish internal stability or territorial integrity, Ankara is faced with new challenges in dealing with its Middle Eastern neighbors and countering the growing external support for the Kurdish insurgency within Turkey. NIO/Warning notes that Iran based irregulars have already made at least one recent raid into Turkey. Ankara has no military contingency plans for entering the Iran/Iraq war, but its interests increasingly are on Iraq's side. A pro-Iraqi tilts might become more pronounced if the Kurds make military gains that threaten the Kirkuk oilfields or threaten Iraq's territorial integrity. Baghdad would be forced to divert more resources from its limited pool of uncommitted military units, decreasing Iraq's ability to stop Iranian offensives. Additionally, further Syrian support for Kurdish raids into Turkey would heighten pressure on Ankara for cross-border retaliation.

Angola.

NIO/Africa, noting the presence of a South African armored unit close to the Angolan border, observes that South African forces may be preparing an intervention strike into southern Angola, possibly to support insurgent operations around Cuito Cuanavale. Intelligence Community representatives do not predict, however, an imminent South African intervention and believe that any South African intervention would be situational, probably in response to a government advance on Mavinga.

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Zambia

Zambia's decision to abandon some IMF-mandated strictures will be popular in the near-term, but if Zambia continues to limit debt service to 10 percent of hard currency earnings, a severe foreign exchange crunch and currency devaluation will occur within a few months. As economic discontent mounts, President Kuanda is likely to instigate new crackdowns and move Zambia closer to a police state.

Suriname

Elections scheduled for later this year are unlikely to diminish Bouterse's influence in the new government, and the transition to civilian rule could be derailed if Bouterse decides to use increased fighting to delay elections. NIO/Latin America believes a more successful insurgency could prompt disgruntled military officers to move against Bouterse. NIO/Warning notes that governmental collapse soon remains possible.

3. NIO/Warning notes these additional areas of continuing warning concern:

North Korea: North Korea has been taking unprecedented steps since April to place at least portions of its economy under military administration. Were North Korea to begin preparations for war, these actions would certinly be part of the actions taken.

South Korea: Broad-based opposition to President Chun's choice of a successor increases the potential for major upheaval soon. Any breakdown in public order will encourage North Korea to consider mounting destabilization operations to foment anti-government riots and sabotage.

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